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“It seems to me that the whole of human life can be summed up in the one 
statement that man only exists for the purpose of proving to himself every  
minute that he is free.”1 - Dostoevsky 
 
D escartes is noted for saying, “the will is so free in its nature that it can never be constrained.”2 In Notes from Underground, Dostoevsky’s Underground Man champions freedom as part of his attack on Cherny-
shevsky’s “rational egoism.”3  This paper intends to contrast 
these positions in order to outline Dostoevsky’s critique of ra-
tional egoism. I begin by highlighting the key elements of 
Chernyshevsky’s, What is to be Done? I shall then sketch the Un-
derground Man’s notion of freedom, which will serve as the ba-
sis to refute Chernyshevsky’s position. Once Dostoevsky’s4 con-
ception of freedom is outlined, I shall examine the type of world 
in which this freedom is possible. This paper also questions the 
sort of world such freedom would entail. I conclude with an 
analysis of whether freedom is the supreme good, supreme evil, 
or neither. However, in order to make such a judgment, I argue 
that one must first answer an overarching question the Under-
ground Man grapples with: what does it mean to be human. My 
position will illustrate that both Dostoevsky and Chernyshevsky 
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assert that freedom is a supreme good, however, each author dif-
fers in his conception of human freedom. I will show that this 
conflict arises because of their differing assumptions concerning 
our human nature.  
 
Chernyshevsky and Rational Egoism 
“Man is so obsessed with systems and rationality that he is ready to 
distort the truth so long as it satisfies logic.”5  
                                                                    -Dostoevsky 
 
 Chernyshevsky’s What is to be Done? served as the catalyst  
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for Dostoevsky’s critique of rational egoism and enlightenment 
thinking. The characters in Chernyshevsky’s book are rational 
egoists, who are guided by nothing but informed calculations 
about their own best interests; at the same time, however, they 
bring a great benefit to others in general.6 Dostoevsky maintains 
that rational egoism is deterministic because it champions the 
idea that humans are necessitated by their nature, which compels 
them to maximize their rational self-interests. Humans are caus-
ally determined in this way because, according to Cherny-
shevsky, we are incapable of acting against our perceived self-
interests. It is on this basis that Dostoevsky thinks Cherny-
shevsky rejects free will as a part of human motivation.7 Cherny-
shevsky and other rationalists believe that, on the basis of sci-
ence, one could construct a society where each individual would 
act in ways that would maximize the interest of themselves and 
the whole. Rational egoists held that human nature was funda-
mentally rational and that an ideal society must therefore be gov-
erned entirely by reason. Under this view, “there is really no 
such thing as free choice,” says the Underground Man.8 In fact, 
free will is nothing but a pre-scientific dream from which we are 
now awakening. We never really had free will, and we never 
really could have it.9  
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Freedom as a Rejection of Rational Egoism 
“Who would want to desire according to a mathematical formula?”10 
- Dostoevsky 
 
 On page 211, the Underground Man tells the reader of 
“something” which is more valuable to every person than his/
her own rational interests. Humans will even challenge the ad-
vantages of utopianism, such as reason, peace and prosperity, 
provided they can attain this primary good. The unknown 
“something” is later identified as freedom.11 Dostoevsky believes 
that rational egoism will fail because free will is excluded from 
the list of advantages offered in a rational utopia. He contends 
that, in a highly rational society, our freedom would become dis-
torted and irrationality would be the only method to exercise 
free will.12 People under Chernyshevsky’s view would be no 
more than “piano keys,” who are merely acted upon as part of  
the larger whole. Beyond the confines of the “piano” (society), 
such devices are useless, since they only gain meaning within the 
context of the system. For Dostoevsky, human motivation con-
sists of more than securing our own rational self-interests. The 
advantages presented by Chernyshevsky are unsuccessful be-
cause they fail to recognize that the greatest advantage is human 
freedom. The Underground Man suggests, “we are becoming 
obsessed with systems and abstract deductions.”13 Our “most 
advantageous advantage” differs from the advantages of rational 
egoism, because it conflicts with their dreams of building a well-
ordered society.14 Humans will go against reason and common 
sense in order to express their will. 
  
Freedom cannot be assigned a relative weight in a 
system of ranked advantages, because it will be pur-
sued, if necessary, regardless of all other advantages. 
We will risk everything, face any danger, and know-
ingly damage ourselves in order to assert our free-
dom. Even if we were provided all other benefits 
(such as peace, prosperity and wealth) with the excep-
tion of free choice, individuals would insist on ex-
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pressing their freedom at the cost of destroying the 
system.15 
 
 Robert Jackson states, “it is impossible to argue with the 
rationalists since reason is on their side.”16 Hence, Dostoevsky 
must irrationally reject reason by way of negation. From the first 
lines of the Underground, the Underground Man attempts to 
demonstrate that people are often irrational. It is within the con-
text of irrationalism that the Underground Man believes he can 
exert his freedom. If we were primarily governed by reason, 
every situation would entail that only one possible choice is 
available – the most rational. If this were true, one could theoreti-
cally predict any future decision a person will make. When rea-
son is the foundation for decision-making, one must merely un-
cover the most “reasonable” choices in order to predict human 
behaviour. With this in mind, I suggest that the Underground  
Man would define freedom as: “the ability to will to do other-
wise, given multiple options.” I think this definition would sat-
isfy Dostoevsky, since the rational egoist can only will to act in 
the way perceived to be most reasonable. If we negate Cherny-
shevsky’s position, we seem to be left with the conception of 
freedom as defined above. The Underground Man thinks that 
reason imposes an evident limitation on human freedom. He be-
lieves there is no such “science of man” that can accurately pre-
dict human choice.  
 
Irrationalism and the Rejection of Rational Self-Interest 
“By all this I am only hurting myself and no one else. Well, let it damn 
well hurt – the more it hurts the better”17  
                                                           -Dostoevsky 
 
 Dostoevsky furthers his argument by introducing the 
idea of self-interested suffering to destroy Chernyshevsky’s uto-
pian project. The Underground Man asserts, “man can deliber-
ately desire something that is stupid just because he wants to 
have the right to desire for himself and not be bound to desire 
what is sensible.”18 At one point, the Underground Man suggests 
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that he is “convinced that man will never renounce real suffering 
since it is the sole cause of consciousness.”19  Although suffering 
is in direct conflict with one’s “rational self-interests,” it works in 
favour of our “most advantageous advantage.” To emphasize his 
own point about free will, the Underground Man contradicts 
himself repeatedly. Throughout the novel he constantly affirms 
and denies his assertions only to illustrate his belief in human 
freedom.  There are certain things reason will never know that lie 
in the unknown depths of conscious willing. For the Under-
ground Man, free will allows him to enter the realm of possibil-
ity, unlike the rational egoist who can only act reasonably.  
 
In What Sort of World is this Freedom Possible?  
“Today, science has succeeded in so far dissecting man that at least we 
know that desire and the so-called free will are nothing but…”20 
-Dostoevsky    
 
 A social utopia is Chernyshevsky’s ultimate goal. Such a 
society is to subordinate everything in it in order to fulfill the 
self-interest of the individuals who seek it. The conception of 
freedom Dostoevsky purports is a direct consequence of the soci-
ety described in Chernyshevsky’s, What is to be Done? It is within 
the context of a rational utopia that the Underground Man’s free-
dom needs to exist. In fact, Dostoevsky even goes as far as to 
claim that the only reason people like the Underground Man ex-
ist is in response to Chernyshevsky’s utopia. Dostoevsky con-
tends that in a wholly rational society, the only method by which 
we can secure human freedom21 is by denying reason itself. Out-
side of such rationalism, irrationality is not required to express 
our free choice. Ironically, Chernyshevsky’s rational egoism has 
led to the creation of irrationalism and the Underground Man. 
There is a constant tension between a rational utopia and the ir-
rationality that Dostoevsky believes is an inevitable result. There 
seems to be a continuous interdependence between these two 
positions. For this reason, Chernyshevsky can never achieve a 
wholly rational utopia. If people like the Underground Man 
must exist, then society cannot be wholly rational. If we agree 
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with the Underground Man’s definition of freedom, then it 
seems people like him would rebel against rational egoism. 
However, Chernyshevsky (and those who agree with him) 
would reject this claim in favour of a different conception of free-
dom, which I shall discuss later. Under this view, Dostoevsky 
would be mistaken in his belief that irrationality is an inevitable 
consequence of this system. 
 
Are the Consequences of Freedom Desirable?  
"To be acutely conscious is a disease, a real, honest-to-goodness  
disease"22 -Dostoevsky 
 
 An important question to consider is whether the free-
dom the Underground Man claims to possess is desirable. In fact, 
several instances within the novel seem to suggest that the Un-
derground Man himself detests his own position. For example, 
he states that he will “never be able to become an insect,” al-
though he “wished to become an insect many times.” His desire 
to become an insect stems from his belief that “consciousness is a 
disease.”23 Although his “heightened consciousness” is meant to 
reflect his emphasis on a freedom that Chernyshevsky specifi-
cally rejected, the lines above seem to question the desirability of 
such freedom.24 If the character that champions free will admits 
to loathing his position, one might question why we should 
strive for anything similar. Of course, if Dostoevsky is correct 
about irrationalism being a direct consequence of social utopian-
ism, we cannot merely “reject” the freedom the Underground 
Man claims to possess. If Chernyshevsky’s utopianism fosters 
irrationalism, then people like the Underground Man must exist. 
However, as abovementioned, Dostoevsky may be incorrect 
about irrationalism being a direct consequence of Cherny-
shevsky’s utopia.  
 Another important issue to examine is the sort of world 
such unrestrained freedom entails. The Underground Man’s in-
tense egoism (not to be confused with rational egoism) seems to 
lead him into a world of isolation. Dostoevsky’s world based on 
egoism is a world of conflict and power relations. In such a 
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world, our interactions with other people would be continual 
power struggles and attempts to exert control over everyone else. 
The chief example would be the Underground Man’s repeated 
attempts to control and manipulate Liza. Even his memories of 
school display his attempts to exercise power over his fellow 
schoolmates. When we contrast this worldview with Cherny-
shevsky’s rational utopia, where everyone acts for the greatest 
benefit of everyone else, one might conclude that Cherny 
shevsky’s position is more appealing when compared to the Un-
derground Man. Perhaps integration into a social utopia should 
be considered the supreme good when compared to the isolation 
and rejection of the underground. 
 
Freedom and Human Nature 
“All man wants is an absolutely free choice”25-Dostoevsky 
 
 Dostoevsky’s conception of freedom seems to entail some 
terrifying consequences. We must admit that living like the Un-
derground Man seems far from desirable. Chernyshevsky’s uto-
pian vision can at least provide people with security, prosperity 
and comfort. The Underground Man, however, will reject such 
“advantages” and embrace the suffering freedom demands. Al-
though the Underground Man does not explicitly state freedom 
is “desirable,” he maintains that it is necessary and that people 
like him will always exist. The reader is required to make a value 
judgment, whereby one must decide whether the advantages of 
utopianism should be sacrificed for the ultimate good – namely, 
freedom. If we grant that rational egoism inhibits free will, 
Dostoevsky leaves his readers with the disconcerting task of 
evaluating whether freedom is actually desirable. I believe that in 
order to answer this question, we must first answer a more im-
portant and basic question: “what does it mean to be human?”  
 Dostoevsky believes that he has discovered the “nature” 
of human beings, that is, our freedom. As the supreme good, ex-
pressing our freedom is more important than any other advan-
tage. Charles Taylor has called this expressivism, which is the 
view that in order to achieve fulfillment in life we need to ex-
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press who and what we are.26 Dostoevsky thinks, “the whole 
meaning of human life can be summed up in the statement that 
man only exists for the purpose of proving to himself every min-
ute that he is free.”27 If humans are inherently free and expressiv-
ism is true, then Dostoevsky’s view must be correct, since Chern-
shevsky seems to reject human freedom. However, many tradi-
tional claims regarding human essence assert that reason is our 
essence, and hence the ultimate good. If this view is correct, then  
Dostoevsky must be wrong, since he clearly supports irrational-
ism in many instances. If humans were inherently rational, then 
Chernyshevsky’s view is correct, since freedom would be ob-
tained by expressing our essence through reason.  
Each position rests on an assumption concerning what it 
means to be a human. Although we can agree that freedom is the 
supreme good, I believe that these assumptions prevent us from 
adequately identifying which conception of freedom is the su-
preme good. If we accept that freedom is “the ability to choose 
between multiple options,” then rational egoism and freedom 
appear irreconcilable.  Rational egoism holds that people will 
always act in the way perceived to be most rational. If this is 
true, then the Underground Man’s conception of human freedom 
is precluded. However, Chernshevsky clearly rejects the Under-
ground Man’s notion of freedom. As a rationalist, he asserts that 
one’s freedom is intertwined with one’s ability to reason. If we 
were inherently rational beings, then expressivism would hold 
that by acting rational we are asserting our freedom. Hence, both 
Chernshevsky and Dostoevsky seem to differ on the conception 
of freedom. It is because we are dealing with different notions of 
freedom that we cannot choose one conception over the other. 
The question is not whether freedom is the supreme good, but 
whose freedom is the supreme good. The answer will therefore 
depend on which author you ask. Dostoevsky seems to think 
freedom is impossible in a rational utopia, while Chernyshevsky 
believes that such a society would be the pinnacle of human free-
dom – which is inherently connected with our capacity to reason.  
Each author, in his own context, agrees that freedom is the ulti-
mate good. They differ, however, in explaining what exactly it 
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means to be free.  
I believe that Dostoevsky has failed to convince the 
reader that his position is the correct one. We have not been pro-
vided a reason (as contradictory as it may sound) to accept his 
argument over Chernyshevsky’s. Until this is done, there is no 
way to discern whose assumption concerning our human nature 
is accurate. It is their differing views of human nature that give 
rise to competing conceptions of human freedom. These compet 
ing definitions, in turn, create the conflict between Dostoevsky 
and Chernyshevsky. Although both authors believe human free-
dom is the supreme good, we cannot know whose conception of 
freedom (and consequently, whose view about human nature) is 
correct. Only when we identify the correct assumption concern-
ing what it means to be human can we recognize whose defini-
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